Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Contents

List of Figures and Tables vii

Acknowledgments viii

List of Contributors ix

1 The Politics of Legitimation in Post-Soviet Eurasia 1
Martin Brusis

2 Comparing Legitimation Strategies in Post-Soviet Countries 18
Christian von Soest and Julia Grauvogel

3 State Capitalism in Eurasia: A Dual-Economy Approach to Central Asia 47
Joachim Ahrens, Herman W. Hoen and Martin C. Spechler

4 Legitimation and the Party of Power in Kazakhstan 72
Adele Del Sordi

5 Legitimacy and State-Led Economic Policy in Georgia 97
Christian Timm

6 Legitimacy, Accountability and Discretion of the Russian Courts 121
Alexei Trochev

7 Concepts of the Nation and Legitimation in Belarus 148
Fabian Burkhardt

8 State Programs, Institutions and Memory in Russia 172
Philipp Bürger

9 Cynics, Loyalists and Rebels in Recent Russian Fiction: Literary Scenarios of Legitimation and the Pursuit of 'Sovereign Democracy' 193
Alfred Sproede and Oleksandr Zabirko

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

10 Comparative Conclusions: Legitimacy and Legitimation in Eurasian Post-Communist States 223
Leslie Holmes

Index 246

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

1
The Politics of Legitimation in Post-Soviet Eurasia

Martin Brusis

The Eurasian successor states of the former Soviet Union hold regular elections, but few political regimes in the region meet democratic standards. Despite the color revolutions and subsequent protest movements, which have shown that the manipulation of elections entails considerable risks for incumbents, non-democratic arrangements of political rule have emerged and persist in many of the region's states. In fact, most of these political regimes have survived public protests and other challenges or threats originating from elite disagreements, ethnic divisions and economic crises. The causes and conditions of this robustness, however, are not yet well understood among scholars.

A growing body of research aims to explore the sources of stability in authoritarian regimes across the world (for reviews of the literature, see Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Morse, 2012; Brancati, 2014). One key finding in this literature points to the role of political institutions such as elections, ruling political parties and legislatures; these perform important functions for authoritarian incumbents, for example, as tools of co-optation, credible instruments of self-constraint or channels of societal information. These important insights have solidly challenged the assumption that formal political institutions are merely facades behind which authoritarian rulers wield discretionary power. Moreover, the use of elections as instruments of authoritarian rule has led scholars to suggest that we are witnessing a new 'electoral', 'competitive' type of authoritarianism that differs from 'closed' or 'full' authoritarianism and democracy (Schedler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2010).

However, the ambition of combining large-n evidence with generalizability has led many scholars in this new wave of research on authoritarianism to adopt instrumentalist or rationalist views of institutions that

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

are most amenable to formal models which ignore national contexts (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Defining institutions primarily as sets of rules that structure interaction, these approaches focus on how utility-maximizing political actors engineer institutions and their regulatory functions. These approaches, however, neglect the fact that institutions also serve legitimatory functions which are embedded in shared historical and cultural experience. But authoritarian rulers cannot simply create political institutions at will. Institutions are more than equilibria, reflecting the preferences of political actors whose behavior they are to regulate (March and Olsen, 1989).

This volume features contributions from scholars who in principle concur with this theoretical position. Their common aim is to study the legitimatory dimension of non-democratic political regimes and the relationship between institutional legitimacy and stability. Based upon an empirical concept of legitimacy that considers legitimacy beliefs and their justifications (Beetham, 1991), institutional legitimacy is conceived here as the functional and normative appropriateness of institutions with regard to shared interpretations and beliefs. This notion assumes a plurality of sources, modes and patterns of legitimation from which political actors can draw upon when either claiming or contesting the legitimacy of institutions.

This volume focuses on a single region, post-Soviet Eurasia (PSE), in order to investigate the impact of historical and cultural references common to this area. For many scholars, PSE is deemed to include Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasian and Central Asian successor states of the former Soviet Union. However, valid arguments can be made in favor of excluding specific states from this group, including other states, dividing the overall region into more homogenous subregions, or studying Russia separately. Research interests and theoretical considerations must inform decisions regarding the definitional scope of this region and the selection of individual countries.

Since this volume studies the politics of legitimation in non-democratic regimes, it seems appropriate to focus on those states that share the legacy of the former Soviet Union and its assumed relevance for legitimation, but which have not established stable democracies. It should be noted that the term 'non-democratic' refers to more and less authoritarian political regimes as well as hybrid regimes situated between full autocracy and consolidated democracy. Moreover, our volume's goal has not been to examine all post-Soviet Eurasian states systematically. Rather, the contributors have identified cases encompassing a single or several countries within this region as examples in order to examine questions of wider regional and theoretical relevance.

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

The conceptual framework for these empirical studies is outlined in this chapter. This chapter explains the relevance of institutional legitimacy for post-Soviet Eurasia and discusses approaches to distinguishing modes of legitimation. It is claimed that struggles over the legitimacy of political institutions are crucial for the stability of non-democratic regimes. The politics of legitimation affects conflicts between rival elite factions, the level of popular support accorded to incumbents and the strength of civil society, because institutional legitimacy shapes both the distribution of resources among political actors and the beliefs held by citizens.

1. Why institutional legitimacy matters

We can look at several features of non-democratic regimes in the post-Soviet and other regions of the world to help explain the importance of institutional legitimacy. First, the legitimating function of elections is a defining attribute of the new authoritarianism that has not been explicitly included within influential contemporary conceptual frameworks (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 18). The recent notions of 'electoral' and 'competitive' authoritarianism aspire to be more parsimonious than the 'classical' definition of authoritarianism proposed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan which includes 'distinctive mentalities' and legitimacy as a key feature of 'democratic-authoritarian hybrid regimes' (Linz, 2000, p. 159; Stepan and Linz, 2013, p. 20).

According to Andreas Schedler, '[e]lectoral authoritarian regimes play the game of multiparty elections [but] violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than "instruments of democracy" ' (2006, p. 3). This definition acknowledges that elections do not de facto serve to select political elites, but rather to reinforce the popular belief that political elites are selected in competitive elections and to cultivate this interpretation among external actors. For elections to become 'instruments of authoritarian rule', a majority of citizens need to believe that they do, in fact, regulate access to power. If incumbent political elites were to give citizens cause to perceive elections as a 'game' rather than a serious competition, the elites would lose their legitimacy.[1]

Similarly, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way stress that '[c]ompetitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are *widely viewed* as the primary means of gaining power but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents' (2010, p. 5, italics added).

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

This definition suggests that popular views about the appropriate competitiveness of elections are the key constraint to incumbents' ability to retain power.

Second, post-Soviet authoritarian regimes differ from other autocracies because they lack sufficient alternative sources of legitimacy. Since fraudulent elections have frequently evoked protests aimed at emulating the popular mobilization of the color revolutions, incumbent elites have ample grounds to be worried about sustaining the legitimatory function of elections. This concern constrains the extent to which they can manipulate outcomes at their discretion. Responding to protests with increased repression could jeopardize the permissive consensus among those citizens who had hitherto tolerated or were indifferent to electoral irregularities. Increased repression would also entail high political costs by damaging, for example, the regime's international legitimacy. Governments in several PSE countries have therefore sought to render increased levels of repression legitimate by adopting more restrictive rules on association and assembly rights that endow law-enforcement agencies with the legal justification to prosecute civil society organizations and activists.

Post-Soviet political elites cannot draw on alternative sources of traditional legitimacy that are still available in the authoritarian monarchies of the Gulf region, for example. Legitimating visions of development are either discredited or (at least) suspected of utopism due to the memory of the failed Communist experiment. Post-Soviet regimes thus depend on their capacities to produce mass prosperity, security and other common goods (Sil and Chen, 2004, p. 363; Feklyunina and White, 2011, p. 401). This systemic performance, in conjunction with incumbent presidents' associated technocratic knowledge and personal charisma, has been an important source of legitimacy. However, this performance has suffered from the global economic crisis that has hit Russia and other post-Soviet countries harder than China and other emerging markets with authoritarian political regimes.

Given the dearth and erosion of alternative legitimacy sources, since 2012, the Russian government has increasingly resorted to mobilizing nationalist sentiment (e.g., Rubtsov, 2014). Russia incorporated Crimea in 2014, claiming that the peninsula constitutes a historical part of Russia, that its residents feel closely tied to Russia and that Crimea's ethnic Russian and Russophone majority populations required protection against threats of forced assimilation emerging from the new Ukrainian government. Russia also supported separatist insurgents in the Eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk who claimed

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

to represent the interests of Ukraine's Russophone citizens. Opinion surveys indicate that these policies – or their heavily biased public communication through state-controlled media – were welcomed by many Russians. Thus, one may infer that they contributed to reinforcing the legitimacy of Russia's incumbent political leadership. However, the appeal of nationalism in the medium to long term remains uncertain, as citizens ultimately begin to feel the associated economic and political costs and as Russia's dependence within the international system becomes more visible.

Third, political regimes in Eurasia have partially opened up access to political office and policy-making through legislatures, the mass media, parties, interest associations and non-governmental organizations. These institutions are assumed to support governing by co-opting critics, conveying unbiased information from society to the regime and exposing regime officials to public scrutiny. To perform these functions, these institutions require legitimacy. In other words, non-governmental actors and the broader public must be convinced that these institutions incorporate different societal interests within the activities of political representation and participation. By establishing and permitting representational institutions, the political regimes in turn endow reform-oriented political actors with institutional and legitimacy resources available to constrain executive discretion.

Fourth, Eurasian states are characterized by a dualism of formal and informal institutions that has been described with reference to concepts such as 'neopatrimonialism', 'patronal presidentialism', a 'dual state' or 'substitutions' (Hale, 2005; Timm, 2010; Petrov et al., 2010; Sakwa, 2011). The extent to which formal political institutions can be successfully employed by a regime depends upon whether informal institutions (for example, clientelism) perform complementary or substitutive coordination and orientation functions. These informal practices may not be disclosed to the public because doing so would render the formal institutions illegitimate (Beichelt, 2014, p. 57). Labelling United Russia a 'party of crooks and thieves', for example, was so damaging to the party and Russia's political leadership because this (evidence-backed) assertion publicly revealed the existence of informal practices and thus delegitimized an important political institution.

2. Modes of legitimation

While most states in the PSE region may be described as electoral authoritarian regimes that rely on elections as the key legitimatory institution

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

for the exercise of political rule, elections are clearly not these states' single source of political legitimacy. Political elites in the region who have lost or depleted their electoral source of legitimacy continue to draw upon a repertoire of strategies to claim legitimacy. What other sources exist and how do different modes of legitimation interact to ensure the stability of political institutions in these countries? Scholars have proposed a variety of answers to these questions.

One of the most differentiated and theoretically grounded analyses of legitimation and legitimacy in Russia has been elaborated by Leslie Holmes who complements the Weberian modes of traditional, charismatic and legal–rational legitimation by distinguishing eight additional modes of legitimation based on empirical observations (Holmes, 2015, 2010, 1993). These modes include the 'goal rationality' suggested by Harry Rigby (1982) as a means of describing the teleological legitimation dominating late Communist systems; 'eudaemonic' legitimation which is based on satisfying the populace; official nationalism, identifying or contrasting with Russia's past; and three modes of external legitimation: international recognition, support from foreign leaders and the emulation of external role models (Holmes, 2015).

Valentina Feklyunina and Stephen White identify the promise of economic modernization as one of the three official narratives used by Russia's political elite to address the post-2008 economic crisis and the threat it posed to regime legitimacy (Feklyunina and White, 2011). According to Eugene Huskey, Russian exceptionalism – that is, Russia's collective identity that centers on being different from the West – combined with technocracy as a method of rule constitutes the key sources of regime legitimacy in President Vladimir Putin's Russia (Huskey, 2013, 2010). For Rudra Sil and Chang Chen, Putin's vision of a resurgent, unified and assertive state, Russia's international image as a great power and the country's economic performance appear to be the most important and effective legitimatory devices (Sil and Chen, 2004; Chen, 2011). Edward Schatz distinguishes Central Asian authoritarian regimes according to their primary legitimacy claims that include international engagement, charismatic authority and anti-Islamism (2006, p. 269). Anna Matveeva argues that political leaders in Central Asia base their legitimation on their achievements in state-building and their guarantees of stability and security, but they have not been very credible in drawing legitimacy from Islamic symbols (2009).

Scholars have only recently begun to compare sources of legitimacy and legitimation modes across a wider range of non-democratic regimes (Kailitz, 2013; Grauvogel and von Soest, 2014). In a comparison of

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

72 authoritarian and democratic countries, Bruce Gilley measures state legitimacy based on opinion and expert surveys, tax revenues and electoral turnout (Gilley, 2009). He finds indicators of good governance, democratic rights and welfare gains to be the strongest predictors of high levels of state legitimacy. However, his research design does not allow any insight into possible patterned interactions between sources of legitimacy.

Steffen Schneider and his co-authors list 23 'patterns of legitimation' that are grouped in categories making reference to (1) the input and output dimensions of the political system and (2) the presence of democratic and non-democratic rule (2010, p. 111). These categories are then used to code media discourses in order to study how globalization affects democratic legitimacy in four Western countries. Focusing on authoritarian regimes, Peter Burnell distinguishes six main sources of legitimacy: the claimed right to hereditary or theocratic rule; political ideology (communism, ethnic nationalism); elections; performance; external legitimation; and origin (2006, p. 548–9; von Soest and Grauvogel, 2015). He argues that the legitimating claims derived from these sources differ in their degree of vulnerability and suggests different strategies for external promoters of democratization.

We therefore face a situation in which scholars not only use a variety of terms to discuss political legitimation but have also drawn on both inductive and deductive methods to comprise lists of modes and types. Furthermore, empirical classifications of legitimation modes differ depending on the country and time period under examination. In order to provide more clarity and structure to the debate, I propose a typology of legitimation modes that is grounded in the regional post-Soviet context as well as theoretical analysis. As for the latter, I draw here on David Beetham's concept of legitimacy (1991) which looks beyond rule-compliant behavior:[2]

> For power to be fully legitimate [...], three conditions are required: its conformity to established rules; the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs; the express consent of the subordinate, or of the most significant among them, to the particular relations of power.
>
> (Beetham, 1991, p. 19)

I assume that ruling political elites need to address these three requirements if they are to acquire and retain political legitimacy, irrespective of whether the political regime is authoritarian or democratic. Each

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

requirement corresponds to a different mode of legitimation, and these modes are both individually necessary and jointly sufficient to ensure legitimacy. To demonstrate that power conforms to established constitutional or legal rules, the ruling elites enforce these rules or, at least, convince other elites and citizens of their commitment to guaranteeing the enforcement of such rules. But valid rules must also correspond with shared beliefs regarding how institutions should function. This justifiability can be achieved by credibly demonstrating that public office-holders act responsively; that is, that they form and implement policies that citizens want (Bingham Powell, 2004). Lastly, political legitimacy requires citizens or their representatives to express their consent to the exercise of political rule. In order to provide evidence of this consent, ruling elites need to demonstrate that they and their policies enjoy popular approval.

It is possible to further specify the three modes of legitimation by focusing on political institutions that are objects of legitimatory politics and policies. Beetham's first condition of legitimacy, rule conformity, is a key theme in the literature on the consolidation of democratic institutions. This literature has been particularly concerned with establishing the validity of rules for those political actors who create these rules and who may therefore be tempted to question rather than accept them as binding constraints for themselves. A consolidated political institution can be defined as

> one in which the (contingent, 'non-natural') rules according to which political and distributional conflicts are carried out are relatively immune from becoming themselves the object of such conflict.
> (Elster et al., 1998, p. 28)

This separation of conflict *under* rules from conflict *over* rules (Offe, 1996) also constitutes a key aim of ruling elites in authoritarian political regimes. To prevent the emergence of entangled and potentially disruptive conflicts, ruling elites are likely to be particularly interested in establishing and enforcing boundary rules that (1) define higher-order institutions that are not at actors' disposal but can nonetheless be used to legitimize enforcement decisions ('vertical consolidation') and (2) insulate institutional spheres from each other ('horizontal consolidation') (Elster et al., 1998).

A primary object of vertical consolidation is the nation state or the political community. Legitimation aims at constituting the nation state as an entity distinct from prevailing political or economic systems and at

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

placing the president as the symbolic representation of the nation state, outside and above the political system. As the undisputable head of state, the president can legitimately arbitrate conflicts in or between the economic and political systems. President Putin's punishment of 'state capture' by wealthy 'oligarchs', for example, aimed at enforcing boundary rules, consolidating the new president's leadership and generating legitimacy for Putin's regime (e.g., Zudin, 2001). Horizontal consolidation refers particularly to boundary rules that separate the political and economic systems and prevent, for example, the appointment of business managers based solely on political loyalty.

Among the legitimation modes defined and discussed by scholars of post-Soviet and other non-democratic regimes, the two Weberian modes of traditional and legal–rational legitimation refer to the existence, observance and enforcement of rules. People may believe in the legitimacy of a political regime because its particular set of informal and formal rules and institutions governing the exercise of political authority has prevailed for a long time; or because the political regime embodies legal rationality – that is, generally applicable formal rules derived from reasonable constitutional principles. Both Holmes and Burnell have included these two modes of legitimation in their classifications (Burnell, 2006; Holmes, 2015), and Christian von Soest and Julia Grauvogel distinguish 'procedural legitimacy' as a strategy corresponding to legal–rational legitimation (2015).

The second condition of legitimacy, justifiability, refers to the fit between political institutions and the normative and functional expectations shared by citizens or elites. To meet this condition, ruling political elites need to act responsively; that is, to show that the government takes popular and elite preferences seriously and that government policies translate these preferences into policy outcomes. These two dimensions of responsiveness reflect the difference between input and output (or performance) legitimacy along with the underlying model of the political system introduced by David Easton (Easton, 1965; Scharpf, 1999).

The institutions generating input legitimacy range from elections to consultation formats with economic and other functional elites to regular televised discussions between the president and selected citizens. They are intended to demonstrate that the political leadership is listening to society and its key groups. Output legitimacy is produced by a wide range of institutions that provide prosperity and security for the general population, along with privileges or rents for key elite groups. In addition, ruling political elites respond to popular beliefs

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

about the nation state by defining membership in the nation, situating the present nation state in history and delineating the state's role in the international system.

In conceptualizing input and output legitimacy as dimensions of governmental responsiveness, no assumption is made as to whether democracies are necessarily endowed with higher input legitimacy than autocracies. Electoral authoritarian regimes do not permit free and fair elections, a fact which can be assumed to suppress or distort the representation of citizens' preferences in the legislature and executive. But governments in authoritarian regimes may be able to replace this defective link in the chain of (democratic) responsiveness (Bingham Powell, 2004) by observing their citizens and adjusting their policies accordingly.

Ruling political elites may thus demonstrate responsiveness through various avenues of legitimation that include socioeconomic performance, goal rationality, nationalism, ideology, the construction of contrasts with a negative past and legitimation through external support or international engagement (Burnell, 2006; Holmes, 2015).

The third mode of legitimation aims at overcoming the informational uncertainties associated with unclear or mixed popular preferences and their aggregation. Ruling political elites in authoritarian regimes suffer particularly from these uncertainties since they restrict the formation and aggregation of preferences through elections, political parties, mass media and other channels of information from society (Wintrobe, 1998; Schedler, 2013). They seek to reduce this uncertainty by demonstrating broad approval for their policies through elections, the legislature, party congresses and affiliated mass organizations. Such manifestations are orchestrated to convince citizens that their fellow citizens are overwhelmingly expressing their consent. These instruments furthermore serve to assure elites that the regime enjoys popular legitimacy, thereby raising the stakes of defection or opposition.

Public expressions of consent are encompassed within most of the legitimation modes distinguished by the above-mentioned scholars, insofar as such expressions may be used to confirm or indicate subordinates' support for socioeconomic achievements, nationalistic or other ideological claims or a state's particular international role (Table 1.1).

3. Legitimation shifts

Thus, legitimation needs and policies are closely linked to the exercise of political power and permeate political institutions, particularly in

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Index

Abkhazia, 39–40, 110
Abramova, Olga, 158, 170
Ahrens, Joachim, ix, 16, 47, 105–6, 115
Akayev, Askar, 33–4
Akhmetov, Serik, 59
Akudovich, Valentin, 155, 163, 170
Aliyev, Heydar, 28, 30, 37
Aliyev, Rakhat, 84
arbitrazh courts, 122, 134
  Higher Arbitrazh Court, 132, 136
Armenia, 27–31, 36, 229–30
Asar, 84
Ata–Meken, 61
autocracy, 2, 34, 122, 166
  see also political regimes, authoritarian
Azerbaijan, 27–31, 35, 37, 239

backwardness, 51–2, 67
Bakhtin, Mikhail, 204
Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, 36, 85
Balcer, Adam, 89
Beetham, David, 7–8, 11, 20, 243
Belarus, 24–7, 38, 148–71
Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, 157
Belarusian People's Republic, 151
Belarusian People's Front, 151, 154
Belosel'tsev, Viktor, 200–3, 205–6
Berdimuhamedov, Gurbanguly, 36–7
Berezovskii', Boris, 203
Bezletov, Aleksei', 207, 209
blogosphere, 172, 180–1
Boeke, Julius Herman, 51, 68
Bolashak program, 60
Borodino, 181, 188
Brusis, Martin, ix, 79, 229, 238
Bürger, Philipp, ix
business capture, 107, 115
Buival, Valerii', 154, 170
Burkhardt, Fabian, ix, 233
Burnell, Peter, 7, 20

Brezhnev, Leonid, 227
Brown, Archie, 243
Brubaker, Rogers, 166

Cassirer, Ernst, 194
Caucasus, 27–31, 40, 139, 201
Central Asia, 31–5, 47–71, 75, 232
  Central Asian Snow Leopard, 76
Chausov, Iurii', 155–6, 160, 170
Chechnya, 139, 206, 213
Chen, Chang, 6
Chernobyl, 141
China, 15, 54–5, 101–2, 226, 241–2
civil society, 161, 166, 178, 220
clientelism, 5
coercion, 223–4, 227, 228, 243
  see also repression
collectivism, 176
color revolutions, 4, 24, 27, 28, 36, 40, 77, 85, 87, 105, 178
Commonwealth
  of Independent States, 26, 31, 75
  Polish–Lithuanian, 24
communication, 11–12, 165, 172, 180, 193
Communism, 4, 24, 31, 53, 153, 197, 201–2, 227, 229–30, 243
Communist Party, 30, 54, 80, 90, 128, 157, 174, 184, 227–8
competitive authoritarianism, 3
Condorcet, Marquis de, 50
consolidation, 8–9, 100, 111, 122, 150, 189, 241
Constitution, 8, 121–2
Constitutional Court, 122, 132–4, 138
constitutionalism, 11, 74, 82, 121–2, 130–1, 141
consultation, 9, 62
coordination, 5, 56–8, 97, 105, 108, 112, 115, 151
corporate political responsibility, 107, 109–10

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

corruption, 30, 55, 64–5, 76, 89, 97, 101, 196–7, 199, 234–6
Council of Europe, 124
credibility, 72, 88
Crimea, 4, 219–20, 241
cult of personality, 37, 173
Customs Union, 61
  see also Eurasian Economic Union

Davé, Bhavna, 77
Debord, Guy, 194
delegitimization, 5, 72–3, 81, 163, 190, 213, 227, 230, 233
Deleuze, Gilles, 201
Del Sordi, Adele, ix, 223, 227
democracy
  managed democracy, 26, 194, 196, 199, 212
  sovereign democracy, 27, 195–6, 220
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, 83
democratization, 7, 28, 33, 34, 86, 89, 148, 150, 195
demonstrations, 164, 206, 212, 224, 238
  see also protests
development
  developmental state, 47, 98–99, 101–2, 105–6, 108, 111, 115–6
dictatorship of law, 26, 220
domination, 47–8, 56–8, 74, 212
Donetsk, 4–5
Dostoevsky, Fyodor M., 198
Dubovitskii', Natan, 196–200, 206, 213, 214, 215–6
dual economy, 51–3, 56–7, 67
dual state, 5, 11, 48, 121–2
Dugin, Aleksandr, 214–9
Durkheim, Emile, 50

Easton, David, 9, 21, 22
electoral authoritarianism, 3, 21–2, 26, 83–5, 166, 238–9
embedded autonomy, 101
empire, 32, 163, 182, 204, 210, 214, 216–8
Eurasia, 2, 208, 215, 217
Eurasian Economic Union, 26, 61, 75, 214, 230
  see also Customs Union

Europe, 50, 51, 148, 154–8, 172, 188, 209, 234
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 62
European Court of Human Rights, 138
European Union, 31, 153–4, 195

Feduta, Aleksandr, 157, 161, 170
Fei, John C.H., 51
Feklyunina, Valentina, 6
Foucault, Michel, 201
foundational myth, 20, 24, 28, 32–3, 150, 227
frames, 73–78, 90, 160–1, 166, 214
Frear, Matthew, 153, 167
Frolov, Valerii, 158–9

gas, 35, 55, 59, 60, 62, 76, 161, 238
Gazprom, 55, 62
Geddes, Barbara, 166
Georgia, 27–31, 97–120, 235–6
Gerschenkron, Aleksander, 51
Gerschewski, Johannes, 22
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 154, 174, 228
Gilley, Bruce, 7, 22, 224–6, 230, 242–3
globalization, 7, 52, 54, 59, 216
Grauvogel, Julia, ix
Great Patriotic War, 14, 172, 175, 177, 181, 183–4, 187, 189
Gryzlov, Boris, 220
Gudkov, Lev, 14, 199, 210, 214, 220
Gumilev, Lev, 208

Habermas, Jürgen, 243, 244
Havel, Václav, 227
hegemony, 216
heroes, 28, 175, 180–3, 187, 189, 193–4, 198, 201–2, 210–1
Hoen, Herman W., ix
Holmes, Leslie, ix, 27, 47, 73, 77, 90, 213
Huntington, Samuel, 90
Huskey, Eugene, 6

Iaroshchuk, Aleksandr, 157, 171
iconography, 26, 195, 201

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

identities
  collective, 6, 193, 199, 217
  cultural, 206, 208
  national, 24, 26, 148–71, 174–5, 229, 234, 243
  negative, 210–1
ideologies, 15, 21, 24, 33, 151, 160, 196, 210, 218–9
illegitimacy, 218–9
informal sector, 56, 58, 61
institutions
  consolidation, 8, 79, 83, 88, 99
  formal, 5, 74, 91, 111–13, 121
  informal, 5, 56, 74, 107, 114, 121
  intermediary, 83
  institutional engineering, 2, 91
Ioffe, Grigorii', 159
Isaacs, Rico, 73–4
Islam, 6, 91
Islamism, *see* Islam
Ivashkevich, Viktor, 159

Jauss, Hans Robert, 194
judicial enforcement document, 137

Kaliakin, Sergei, 158, 170
Karimov, Islom, 37, 38
Kazakevich, Andrei, 149, 150, 152, 165
Kazakhstan, 31–5, 59–61, 72–96
Kazhegeldin, Akezhan, 83, 92
Kazulin, Aleksandr, 167
KGB, 200, 201
Khalyktyn dauycy – Golos Naroda, 86
Khanat, 75
Khodorkovskii', Mikhail, 15
Kielmansegg, Peter Graf, 173
Kocharyan, Robert, 29
Kolbin, Gennady, 90
Kononov, Vasilij, 220
Krishtapovich, Lev, 158, 170
krysha, 60
Kuchma, Leonid, 25, 26, 27
Kudrin, Aleksei, 131, 137, 142
Kunaev, Dinmukhammed, 90
Kuttykadam, Sei'dakhmet, 92
Kuznets, Simon, 51
Kyrgyzstan, 31–6, 241

Latushko, Pavel, 161, 162
Lazika, 109
Lee Kwan Yew, 54
legality, 26, 133–6, 143
legitimacy
  claims to legitimacy, 18–20, 22–3, 41
  input legitimacy, 10, 25, 86, 92, 226
  institutional, 2–3, 72, 78–80
  legitimate power, 7, 212–3
  output legitimacy, 9–10, 97, 115–6, 226
  popular legitimacy, 10–1, 19, 72–3, 79, 84–5, 163–5, 189, 223, 225–6, 228, 236
  procedural legitimacy, 21–2, 27, 31–2, 34
  sources of, 4–7, 20–2, 73–8, 105–6, 173, 218, 220
  State legitimacy, 242
legitimation
  charismatic, 21, 73–4, 199, 212–3, 227, 229
  eudaemonic, 27, 77, 213, 227, 231–3
  legal–rational, 228, 234–9
  modes of, 11, 19–22, 73–4, 223–4, 226–42
  shifts, 10–2, 35–9, 85, 89, 115, 175, 223, 238, 242–3
  traditional, 212–13, 227, 228
Lenin, Vladimir I., 201–2, 218
Leninism, 228
Leshchenko, Natalia, 150–1
Lewis, Arthur W., 51–2, 68
liberalism, 114, 203, 213, 220
liberalization, 33, 62, 76, 85–6, 105, 107, 112
liberation, 20–1, 24, 150, 184, 206
Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 53
Limonov, Eduard, 206–7
Linz, Juan, 3, 241
Lithuania, Grand Duchy of, 151, 154
loyalty,79, 83, 86, 122, 151, 206, 218, 243
Lukashenka, Alexander, 24–6, 37, 38, 149, 156, 159–61
Lukin, Vladimir, 125

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Magnitskii', Sergei', 122
Malthus, Thomas, 49
Manaev, Oleg, 161, 171
manipulation, 73, 197, 223
Marples, David, 159
Marx, Karl, 50, 68
Masaryk, Tomáš, 227
Mashkevich, Aleksander, 59
Matveeva, Anna, 6
Matveichuk, Vladimir, 161
Media, 11–12, 177–8, 194–6
Medvedev, Dmitrii', 27, 89, 125, 128–9, 140, 190, 212, 238
memories
  historical, 75, 214
  Politics of, 172–5, 183–190
Meyer, Alfred, 224–5
Milinkevich, Aleksandr, 155–6, 160–1, 171
mobilization, 72, 80–1, 85, 87, 91, 148–9, 150, 155, 165, 210–1, 219–20
Moldova, 23–7
modernization, 29, 51, 57, 91, 104–5, 208
  theory, 51
myth, 181, 194, 200–6
  see also foundational myth

Nabokov, Vladimir, 205
Nagorno-Karabakh, 28–9, 36, 40
Narodnost, *see* nationalities
narratives, 21, 173, 190, 193, 195
nation, 8–10, 148–9
NationalHeroChannel, 180
nationalism, 21, 24–5, 28–9, 31, 73–5, 176, 213–4, 233
nationalities, 229, 243
nationhood, 159–60, 166
nation state, 8–10, 151, 215–6
NATO, 31, 153, 230
Naval'nii', Alexei, 122, 212
Nazarbaeva, Dariga, 84
Nazarbaev, Nursultan, 33
Neklaev, Vladimir, 157, 161, 170
neoliberalism, 105, 111–14
Nesterenko, Tatiana, 140
New Public Management, 101–5
Nicholas I., 229
Night Wolves, 179
Niiazov, Saparmurat, 33, 36, 229, 234
November Parade, 183–8
Novorossiia, 14
Nur Otan, 72–3, 78–93

obshchestvennaia priemnaia, 87
Offe, Claus, 82
oil, 30, 55, 59, 60–2, 76, 92, 233, 238
Oktyabrskaya, Mariya, 181
oligarchs, 9, 59, 173–4, 201, 214, 220
Orange Revolution, see color revolutions
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 35, 75–6, 85–6, 89, 239

Park Chung Hee, 54
parliaments
  Mazhilis, 82, 84, 86, 92
  State Duma, 134, 220, 228
parties of power, 72–3, 78–93
  Belaia Rus', 162, 171
  Nur Otan (Radiant Fatherland), 72–3, 78–93
  SNEK/PNEK, 81–2
  United Russia/Edinaia Rossiia, 5, 134, 212
passionarnost, 208, 214
patriotic education, 174–180
patriotism, 150, 152, 172, 175–7, 182, 189, 197, 233, 243
Pazniak, Zianon, 151, 154, 171
peace, 34, 91, 188, 211, 218
Pelevin, Viktor, 203
performance
  judicial, 129, 133–6
  security–providing, 12, 68, 77, 202
  socioeconomic, 27, 38, 76–8, 230–3
  see also output legitimacy
periphery, 48, 52, 56–8, 60–2, 67–8, 207
personalism, *see* legitimation, charismatic
personalization, 195
Pigarev, Sergei, 162–3, 171
Platonov, Andrei', 205
political legitimacy, *see* legitimacy

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

political parties
'A Just World' party, 157, 158
Asar, 84
Belarusian Christian Democratic Party, 155
Belarusian People's Front, 154
Belarusian Social Democratic Party, 158
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, 83
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, 240
For Freedom Movement, 155
Iabloko, 158, 167, 180
Liberal Democratic Party, 228
National–Bolshevik Party, 206–7
Speak the Truth Movement, 157, 170
see also parties of power
political regimes
authoritarian, 1–14, 18–9, 22, 35–6, 39–41, 54–5, 91, 123, 148–9, 194–6, 238–9
Durability, 19, 79, 97, 148–9, 166, 242
hybrid, 19, 41, 152, 223
totalitarian, 80
polittekhnologiia, 196
Polotsk, Principality of, 151
populism, 26–7, 101
Poroshenko, Petro, 229
Postcommunism, 123, 228
Post–Soviet Eurasia, 2
Pozner, Vladimir, 220
Prebisch–Singer Hypothesis, 50
preference falsification, 22
presidents, 9, 11, 25–6, 29–30, 33–4, 73–4, 195, 229
press, *see* media
Prigov, Dmitrii', 201
Procuracy, 125, 127–8, 139
propaganda, 34, 39, 194, 196
Prilepin, Zakhar, 206–12
Prokhanov, Aleksandr, 200–6
protests, 24, 28, 36, 82, 89, 108, 148, 206, 212, 238
see also demonstrations
Putin, Vladimir, 26, 35, 129, 195, 200–1, 204–5, 228–9, 238
Rakymzhanov, Amyrkhan, 92
Ranis, Gustav, 51
Raskol'nikov, Rodion, 198
reenactments, 184–7, 194
regimes, *see* political regimes
repression, 4, 19, 72–3, 166, 222, 238, 242
see also coercion
responsiveness, 8–11, 79, 85–8
revolutions
mental, 101
see also color revolutions
Rigby, Harry, 6, 226
Rose Revolution, *see* color revolutions
Rostow, Walt, 51
Russia
Audit Chamber, 138
Constitutional Court, 121–2, 132–4, 138, 143, 144
exceptionalism, 6
Federal Treasury, 137–8, 140
Government, 26, 38, 122, 129–41, 172, 176
Holy Russia, 210
Ministry of Defense, 139–40, 145
Ministry of Education, 180
Ministry of Finance, 137, 139, 142
Ministry of Internal Affairs, 139
Ministry of Justice, 104, 127–8, 137
political elites, 197, 201
political leadership, *see* political elites
Roskultura, 180
Supreme Court, 132–6, 140, 143
United Russia (political party), 5, 134, 212
Russianness, 179, 216
Rymashevskii', Vitalii', 156, 163

Saakashvili, Mikhail, 28–9, 30, 36, 39, 97–101, 234–5
Sacred War, 186
Saint–Simon, Henri de, 50
Samobytnost', 216
Samokhodov, Yegor, 197
Samruk–Kazyna, 59, 60
Schatz, Edward, 6, 73, 75, 90
Schedler, Andreas, 3
Schmitt, Carl, 214–9

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432

Schneider, Steffen, 7
schoolbooks, 177–8
secularization, 51, 52
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 26, 75, 242
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 28, 30, 97, 234
Shushkevich, Stanislav, 167
Sil, Rudra, 6
Singapore, 54, 76, 93, 98–9, 111–14
Smith, Adam, 49
Smith, Antony, 161
Smutnoe vremia (Time of Troubles), 173
Spechler, Martin C., ix
Sproede, Alfred, ix
Sobianin, Sergeii', 188
socialism, 50, 53, 68, 123, 128, 158
Solomon, Peter, 128, 130, 133, 136
Sorel, George, 214
Sorokin, Vladimir, 203, 219
South Ossetia, 39–40
Soviet Union (USSR), 2, 24, 40, 55, 80, 128, 164, 183, 200, 207, 210, 217, 228
Stalin, Josif V., 183, 190, 194, 213, 218
Stalinism, 202–3, 220
state capitalism, 53–7
statehood, 75, 124, 151, 160
state of exception, 214–16, 221
state socialism, 53
Statkevich, Mykola, 167
Stepan, Alfred, 3, 241
St. George's Ribbon, 179
substitutions, 5, 51, 66, 72, 88, 113, 184, 208
succession, 36
Sultanov, Bahyt, 59
support
  diffuse, 149
  specific, 22
Surkov, Vladislav, 195, 196, 213–16
Suvorov, Alexander V., 181–2
symbols, 29, 73, 77, 162, 174, 178, 183, 187, 202
  symbolic politics, 74, 214
  Soviet symbolism, 174

Tajikistan, 31–5
Tasmangambetov, Ismangali, 59
technocracy, 6, 29
Ter Petrosyan, Levon, 29, 36
Timm, Christian, x
Timoshenko, Yulia, 27
Tishin, Sasha, 206, 207, 219
traditionalism, 213, 228–9, 233–4
transformation, 106, 124, 141, 158, 212
Transnistria, 39–40
Trochev, Alexei, x, 234
Trusov, Oleg, 163
Tulip Revolution, 36
  see also color revolutions
Turkmenbashi, 33
Turkmenistan, 31–5, 239

Ukraine, 23–7, 148, 212, 219–20, 229, 238, 241
Uranium, 59, 67
Uslaner, Eric, 236
USSR, *see* Soviet Union
Uzbekistan, 31–5, 61–7

Viachorka, Franak, 154
Viachorka, Vintsuk, 154
von Soest, Christian, x, 9, 227
Voronin, Vladimir, 25, 27

Way, Lucan, 3, 149–50, 153, 165
Washington Consensus, 105, 111–13, 115
Weber, Max, 6, 9, 19, 21, 33, 73–4, 102, 173, 212–13, 224, 226–8, 234
White, Stephen, 6

Yanukovych, Viktor, 25–7, 36, 238
Yeltsin, Boris, 26, 174, 175, 183, 184, 188
Yerofeev, Viktor, 199
YUKOS, 122
Yushchenko, Viktor, 27, 36

Zabirko, Oleksandr, x
Zhanaozen, 92
Zhirinovskii', Vladimir, 228

Copyrighted material – 9781137489432